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Lorraine Maynard
Thank you, Rebecca. Thank you, Dean (Pagan) and the university,
the Journal. I'd like to congratulate, as well, the team -- the Journal, who put
this together. I was impressed at how serious they were; not only in
organizing the speakers and the program and all, but making sure it would be
relevant to the overturned Enron and WorldCom and Tyco, and all those
companies just so that everybody would be interested in today's talk. So, I'm
impressed with the Journal.
This is obviously a topic that has engaged people like very few
others in the business world for quite a long time. Those of us who are
involved in corporate governance for some time are suddenly -- you know,
people actually know what that word means. As late as last November, the
New York Times never even used the words "corporate governance" unless
it was in quotes or with an explanation as to what it meant. Today, of course,
it's front page.
Just as a way of starting, I might just refer to an interesting
conference that took place about 18 months ago in Houston. The topic was
on ethics in business. Believe it or not, one of the keynote speakers was
(Kenneth Blake), the chairman and CEO of the Enron Corporation. One of
the things that he said then, we now can look back on and say well, where
did he get this from? What he said was, that a chairman - rather a CEO --
picks the kind of board that he wants; that best suits him for the success of
the company.
Isn't that really the issue that we're dealing with today? Is that we
have boards - not just at Enron, but across the United States, and really in
many ways across the world -- which have failed in their principle duty of
overseeing companies, and making sure that they reach the maximum
shareholder value that the management in charge of companies is there to
push the company for maximum success within the law, and bearing in mind
the important value of the asset of a company.
In fact, we can look back at the collapse of the Asian economy some
years ago - the Asian financial crisis -- which has now been considered to a
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great extent a corporate government's crisis; a crisis of crummy capitalism.
In fact, the United States has a crisis of crummy capitalism that has occurred
in fours. Actually, if you look at it right down the line, we think of it really
as a pack of dominos. There were watchdogs intermediaries that we
expected as investors to serve their duty in making sure the companies were
successful. But again, within the law, and like a pack of dominos, each of
them fell because in many ways, they were conflicted.
If we think about the brokers who worked for investment banks --
analysts rather -- that worked for investment banks, we think of accounting
firms right down the line, starting from the board. We have these conflicts.
Now, the good news is that all of this opens up the possibility for change in
the United States for reenergizing boardrooms. Because those of us who
have worked in this field for many years, know that the United States has
been complacent for very long -- for much too long -- in the way in which
we operate our corporate government.
My firm, for example, puts out a study once a year called, The Lead
Corporate Governance Indicators. We have listed the United States as No. 2,
not No. 1 in corporate governance -- No. 2 behind the U.K. Every year until
this year, we've gotten criticism from American colleagues who say: We
have the best accounting standards in the world; we have the best boards of
directors in the world; we have the best disclosures in the world; how could
you say that we don't have the best governance in the world?
But the fact is, we haven't. That's now blindingly obvious, where it
was not before. The great thing about the United States, as we all know, is
that we're very good at going through these huge dirty, explosive scandals,
and then acting swiftly to right that problem -- to find and fix it. The fact is,
that without those kinds of big explosions -- and sometimes we are perhaps
not as good at trying to preempt the problems, as we perhaps should be. So,
we're almost pretty much frozen, up until Enron. Now, it's as if everything is
possible. Perhaps not everything, but many reforms are possible and many
reforms have already been undertaken, and I'd like to talk about a few of
those as we go forward.
At the international convention, which is quite extraordinary, you
listen to voices in many markets around the world. The Enron, WorldCom
and other scandals have made a big impact. I remember speaking with the
head of an accounting firm in South Africa. I think it was last winter. And I
was asking, "What was your reaction to Enron?" And she said, "Well, my
first reaction was I just thought it was hilarious. This great company actually
turned out to have been a criminal enterprise."
But her second reaction was a more interesting one. And that was
that she was scared. Why was she scared? -- because naturally, Enrons are
possible in any market, not just our market. In fact, in our American market
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they maybe more possible to discover than in many markets where disclosure
is less; where there are fewer intermediaries; where the chances of a slip up
on the part of fraudulent management might be harder to defect. So, she was
scared.
The fact is, that we have seen in market after market, countries going
forward and saying we've got to look at our company more often. We've got
to look at our state regulation. We've got to look at our intermediaries.
We've got to look at our government's practices and see if we can prevent an
Enron happening in our country.
What I think this is leading to in a very interest way, which we can
talk about, is a convergence of governance practice all over the world. We're
seeing, for example, a convergence of the idea that independent directors are
critical to the success of a company. Now, that's something that we couldn't
have imagined a few years ago, but there is this convergence that's
happening and I think we really see that it has been accelerated by the onset
of scandals in this country.
What I'd like to talk about is -- and I'd like to break this into three
parts -- is ways in which we are moving and ways in which we need to move
to right the situation in the United States, and really globally. What I1 do is
talk about is regulation -- for one thing, what government can do. For
another, I'll talk about what investors can do. For a third, I'll talk about what
boards can do. Altogether, if we can sort of put it all together in a package at
the end it amounts to today's topic, which is rebuilding accountability in the
boardroom.
So, let me turn for a moment to regulation. It's very timely. Very
timely because as we sit here today, the SEC is meeting - the commissioners
-- are meeting to decide the next chairman and members of the Public
Accountability Oversight Board, which was mandated, as you know, by this
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act). I say that at the beginning because this is a very
critical decision. It's just the naming of a few names and getting that agency
off the ground. But the fact is, it's critical because what the (Sarbanes-
Oxley) did in setting up the oversight board was to make a fundamental
judgment that what we need, if we're going to supervise the accounting
industry - and first of all we need to "do." That is what (Sarbanes-Oxley)
said, but we need to do it with an independent voice.
It needs to be an agency that is not captured by the accounting
industry, but is able too oversee it. That is, I think, the good news because
we've seen real problems -- as became obvious, with Arthur Anderson going
belly up -- in the integrity of certain accounting firms, and the conflicts that
give rise to the perception of integrity of the accounting firms. So we need
to have, as (Sarbanes-Oxley) said, some independent voice. Now, that's the
good news.
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The bad news is the way that's been handled is exactly wrong.
Exactly wrong because today the news will hopefully prove me wrong, but
as of at least two hours ago when I checked, it looked as if where the SEC
was going to head was a split decision along partisan lines as to who should
chair that board.
We were talking at lunch earlier about the partisan splits in the
Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election, and what
that did to the integrity of the Court -- the reputation of the Supreme Court.
The fact is, that if we have regulation that is split along party lines, we have a
real problem in being able to even get this new agency off the ground in a
way that can draw public confidence and investor confidence in the market
place.
So, my great fear is that while our legislation was headed in the right
direction, the way it is implemented could have real problems. My fear is
that it may take quite a long time, much longer than it should for the SEC to
be able to gain back the integrity, or the sense of perception of independence
that it appears to have lost. Indeed, whether the new accounting oversight
board can get away from what looks like the perception right at its birth; that
it too, can be captured by the industry that it has been charged with
overseeing.
That said, the (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) has been very important, and of
course some of you may know, it's a curious mixture of these two names.
Representative (Oxley) fought every step of the way against this legislation.
So actually, I really would prefer to call this the Sarbanes Bill in the way it
was formulated. But nonetheless, it ultimately did represent the meeting of
the minds in the Congress. There was a bipartisan vote in favor of it, and
that's very important. It sort of sets the tone, which we hope will be restored.
The criticism of (Sarbanes-Oxley) has been that it is set into law -- this black
letter law -- too many very specific regulations.
A good example, the SEC just a week or so ago, released
implementing regulations or rules on one portion of (Sarbanes-Oxley) that
has to do with the amount that companies need to disclose about their audit
committee members. It's very, very specific about the kinds of disclosure
that companies have to make. But what precise skills do the members of the
audit committee have to have?
A lot of people would say this is really micromanaging through law.
Ultimately, it's an approach that suppresses the kinds of dynamism that we
need, the innovation that we need, the creativity and entrepreneurial spirit
that we need in our companies so that they can generate growth and jobs. I
have some sympathy with that. I think probably given more time it would
have been perhaps preferable, if not, but rather broader principles, and letting
[Vol. 3:1
2003] REBUILDING ACCOUNTABILITYIN THE BOARDROOM 5
companies meet those principles in ways that they find best for their own
corporate culture.
But we do have it. As I say, we have sort of a propensity in this
country to fix things as quickly as we can, and we did. The fact is, that it
will improve governance, for the most part, in many companies. We have
lots of companies in America where we don't have an independent majority
on the board of directors. Well, (Sarbanes-Oxley) will require that. We have
lots of companies where we have audit committees without people that know
anything about how to read financial statements. I mean, is it any wonder
that if you look at the latest statistics, about one out of ten companies --
public companies in America -- are now restating their accounts, their
financial statements from the past few years.
We've seen in the newspaper everyday now, today was Bristol
Myers. I think yesterday was AOL Time Warner -- not small companies, not
insignificant accounting jobs, not insignificant people on their board audit
committee. Yet, they're coming forward, under pressure really, from the
(Sarbanes-Oxley) legislation. Do you remember when we said advertising
revenues were holding steady? Well, it turned out not to be the case. And
no doubt there will be much work for many of the lawyers in this room as the
result of (Sarbanes-Oxley) and many of these statements that are going on.
But, then we need to have -- and I think (Sarbanes-Oxley) goes a
long way to do it - better boards, better oversight of these issues. That's not
to say that we need more boards that can also spur good strategy and
entrepreneurial spirit. This part of the board's job, which is, overseeing
accuracy in financial statements, needs a lot of work. The new legislation
requires CEOs, as we know, to sign off on all the financial statements that a
company produces. As some of our colleagues have said, if you make it
clear that CEOs will go to jail if they sign accounts that are misleading and
inaccurate, then that's a way of crossing trading lines. It's pressure that was
not necessarily there before.
We have a lot more that could be done from the government's side.
I'll talk about one particular item I think is very important when we get to the
issue, or the role, for shareholders. We also need to tackle some chronic
infrastructure problems that impede accountability -- that make it less than it
should be. For example, you would have thought that shareholders should be
able to vote up or down on the board of directors. The fact is, any of you
who have a proxy statement, realizes that you have two choices when you
vote. One, is to vote in favor of the board, and the other, is to withhold your
vote -- not to vote against.
In other words, in most companies you could have 99 percent of
shares voting to withhold their votes -- the board still elects them. But that's
the general rule. So, we need to review the ways in which shareholders can
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exercise oversight of a report. That is going to take a change from law.
Another area we look at is the fact that right now, when votes take place for
the board, it counts for all those in favor -- all votes passed by shareholders
in favor and all votes withholding or passed against, and then the outcome is
determined by that.
But, that's not the case. In fact, what happens is that there is about
20 percent or so of the vote, which I'm sure is outstanding rather, that are not
voted in the sense of the investors giving instructions to their agents to vote.
Yet, those votes are cast. They're cast by brokers. And, they're cast 100
percent of the time in favor of management. So, you have these so called
"broker non-votes," which represent a built-in management protection
device. That's been allowed for years and years, and it needs to change.
We also need changes in things like international accounting
standards. The United States, as we know, have had for many years what has
been considered particularly by the United States, the best accounting
standards in the world -- the U.S. gap. Now we know that that set of rules
have been flouted and exploited by companies that have the intention of
misleading their shareholders.
There is a view, which is now actually held by some of the highest
ranking officials in the United States responsible for accounting. That in
fact, our approach, which the a rules based approach, is not as effective as
the principles based approach that's favored by the International Accounting
Standards Board. For years we have resisted this move toward LAS. Now, it
looks as if, finally, we need to make an accommodation with the IAS. We
need to move through our laws and regulations to embracing that kind of
approach.
That means, by the way, doing things like forcing companies to
disclose the expense, the real expense, of their stock options programs
because that will be part of international accounting standards. It should be
part of our American standards, but unfortunately, our politicians on both
sides of the aisle blocked measures to that effect about six or eight years ago.
My guess is that we're moving in the direction now where we will have stock
options expensed.
That again, will allow us so exercise more accountability. We'll get
greater accuracy accounts. We'll be able to monitor our corporate boards
much better if that happens. So, I think that there has been progress in
governance. In action, there's a long way to go. It's heartening that we are
addressing long festering issues that have plagued our government in the
United States. I'm worried about how our SEC is going to implement that.
But nonetheless, we have made progress where no progress really has been
made for many, many years.
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Let me talk for a moment about the second of that sort of triad of
issues I was talking about -- the owners, the shareholders. Actually, there's
an argument over the lexicon here too, because it has long been -- it actually
started out where the market used the word "stockholders." It moved to
shareholders and now it's moved to "shareowners," trying to get, perhaps, the
most appropriate way of approaching this issue.
We have a market now in the United States, and in some other
countries as well, where institutional investors own a huge amount of our
equity; more than they ever owned over time. Because in the past, if you
think about it, we've had a period of time where there were - and this is the
case in many parts of the world, still - founding owners that were dominant
at companies, or in many countries that the state was the dominant owner, or
there were some form of block holder that controlled public companies.
We are now are in a state where the main holders of capital in the
United States are pension funds and mutual funds. These represent, of
course, us. People like you and me, ordinary folks that happen to have our
4OKs being managed by companies or mutual funds. So, there are
institutions themselves that own a large portion of American enterprise.
When we think about accountability and how to energize
accountability in the boardrooms, my view is, before we even think about the
boardrooms themselves, we've got to think about who owns those
boardrooms. We've got to think about the source of economic power in the
United States, which is of course, the capital market. These are the folks that
own America in some respects. One of the reasons why we've seen a
collapse of governance is because those shareowners have not acted as
owners.
In fact, one of the reasons why they haven't acted as owners is
because they can't, in many cases, meet the minimum corporate governance
guidelines that they asked the companies to meet. Think about that. We're
talking about these huge institutional investors that are out there saying: We
want boards to disclose more; we want independent directors to hold separate
governance principles that have been out there for a while. But, then look at
the institutions themselves. Mutual funds -- good example - they own a
huge portion of capital America.
If you are someone who has money in a mutual fund, and you want
to find out how does it vote at annual meetings in the United States - does it
vote? What are its principles for voting? Does it like executive pay that's
not tied to performance? For example, does it take any action when a board
doesn't have sufficient members for independent directors?
Well, you know something? You cannot fmd that out. You cannot
find it out at almost every mutual fund in the United States, and that's just
wrong. It's not only wrong, it's damaging to the United States because it
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takes out of the marketplace a very large portion of capital that could make a
difference. That isn't too say that they aren't voting by the way, they might
be. In fact, most of them probably are, but they face conflicts too. Mutual
funds face conflict.
After all, if you put yourself in the shoes of a mutual fund CEO, you
have the possibility of voting against the management of a company that you
think are just failing -- an Enron, say, two years ago. Yet, you may also need
Enron's business because you're trying to be their provider for 401Ks. You
want to manage their pension accounts, their fund management. Well, that's
a conflict, which might not affect the way you vote, but it might. The fact is,
that there's no sunlight beaming in on that. There's no disclosure. But then,
you, as someone who puts money into that fund, you've no idea how they
vote. Now, one of the good things in the last month, is that for years after
having sat on this very request, the SEC did make a proposal last month,
which would require mutual funds to disclose their voting policies and their
votes. We'll see if it passes. There is considerable opposition for it, but we'll
see if it passes.
My view is that it has to pass if we are to look to capital as a way of
reenergizing boardrooms. Another thing that I think needs to pass, is that if
you look at another constituent of the capital market -- mutual funds is one,
pension funds would be another. Pension funds are run by, or rather,
governed by regulations that were adopted by the 1974 (ERISA Act), and
then they can follow regulations passed by the Department of Labor that
were adopted after that.
(ERISA) regulations do say that pension funds do have to vote.
They have to vote their shares. By the way, that's all pretty much what it
says. It doesn't require any other form of activism. But nonetheless, it does
say voting has to take place and when votes do take place, they have to
follow the interests solely of the members of pension funds; in other words,
not any other competing or conflicting interest.
Now that's good. But there's one problem that needs to be rectified -
- and there is legislation pending in the Congress about it -- and that's this,
the corporate pension funds are entirely controlled by management. Look at
Enron's performance. That's why we have rules in place, which locked
employees into investing in Enron for a period of time -- their 40lKs, for
example, for investment vehicles. We have too many cases of that
happening.
But the fact is, what we don't have is a system in place which gives
employees of corporations any say whatsoever in the ways in which their
funds are managed. You can choose what accounts, if you're in a defined
contribution plan, you can choose where your money ought to go -- social
choice account or U.S. funds, you know the choices. But what you can't do
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is have any say at all in the way in which the fund operates as an owner. So,
if it has shares in a company, how does it vote?
Well, not only do you not know about that, but, you have no say in
how it's done. The perception exists that those corporate funds are pretty
much once again in management protection device because they vote almost
a hundred percent of the time, as far as anyone knows, with management --
automatically. Regardless of whether their company is troubled, regardless
of whether their dissident resolutions are on the ballot, they vote if favor of
management.
There has never been - as far as I'm aware -- any case where
corporate pension funds, for example, has initiated a dissident shareholder
resolution at an American company. Yet, the public funds do that all the
time. But we don't have that in our corporate funds.
Now there is legislation imposed in the Labor and Employment
Division of the Senate regarding the form of pension funds that would have
the United States join or adopt practices that currently exist in the U.K. and
Australia, and a few other countries, which says that employees should be
able to name or vote for some trusting representation on the pension funds.
I think, if we were to look for what are the sort of infrastructure
changes that would make for greater accountability in the boardrooms, that
would be - to my way of thinking -- a very critical defense. We need to
look, for example, if you want to energize the institutions, we can look no
further than that United Kingdom, where there has been a great deal of
thought going to this issue.
Quite recently -- as recently as two days ago -- when the entire
investment community in Britain gathered under the Umbrella Institutional
Shareholders Committee, released what I think is a very critical statement
designed actually to head off legislation. It's a very critical statement that
lays out a set of guidelines and proposals for what institutions should be
doing as owners of equity not only in the U.K, but wherever they hold stock.
It involves things like, yes, you should vote clearly. Every fund ought to
vote.
They also go further than that - well, that's where (ERISA) stops in
this country and they say, not only should you vote, but you should actually
understand what you're voting for. You should have in your fund, resources
to look at and monitor the corporate governance of any company that you are
investing in. You do it in-house. You work it out, whatever you do. But
you've got to have research. You've got to have knowledge. You've got to
vote in an informed way.
The other thing that the U.K. statement says, is not only do you have
is fiduciary obligation to vote, but you also have fiduciary obligation to vote
in an informed way. You also have a fiduciary obligation to become an
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activist owner. In other words, if you see something going on, voting may be
part of it, but you also need to be engaged with the company. You need to
let the company know what the problems are that you see, or at least
dialogue with the company, so that you understand what these issues are.
You need to be an engaged owner.
In my view, this is something that is extremely critical, and we won't
have a real fundamental infrastructure change until we go further along that
path that we have. There are tools now available for institutions to be able to
pick up that knowledge and learn those tactics. There are some of them that
are very new. I, myself, am involved with one of government metrics
internationally. For example, GMI is meant to be rating companies around
the world on corporate governance. So that what you'll be able to do is to
look at a General Motors, for example, and compare it on corporate
governance risk against any other automobile company in the world.
It means that suddenly this stuff is transparent. You'll really be able
to compare apples to apples. Just like in the European Union, with the Euro,
you can now tell what is the difference between the price of a (friot) in Paris
as compared to the price of a (friot) in Athens.
Now, with corporate governance sort of rating tool -- which by the
way, GMI isn't the only one doing this, there are SMPs doing it as well --
you'll be able to figure out; okay, how does GM compare in governance to
others. So, we're seeing the market coming up with solutions to this issue,
how to energize owners. But we need help, I think, from legislation.
All right. Finally, let me talk for a moment about the board and what
needs to happen, I think, to energize boards in America. Here, I would site a
nice one of my favorite quotes from (John Kenneth Galbraith), and it's on
executive pay, but it's emblematic to the issue. What he said was that we
would be wrong if we think of CEO compensation levels as somehow a
reward for performance.
What it really is, is executive duty in the nature of a warm personal
gesture by the CEO to himself. In many ways that's where we are in
America. The reason is this: We, I think, kid ourselves -- I'm being very
frank here -- but I think we kid ourselves if we think that because we have, as
we do, more independent directors on U.S boards than almost any country.
Those boards, therefore, are accountable. They are looking out for the
interest of the shareholders.
My view is that so long as we have a situation where the chairman
and the CEO is generally one person -- and that's the case in at least 80
percent of companies in America -- as long as that's the case, we then have a
situation where the CEO is policing him or herself. We are not going to be
able to get the integrity back or investor confidence back until we address
that fundamental issue of architecture in our boards in the United States.
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The reason I say this is because the boards really does have a separate role
from management. The board is not to micromanage. It's not there to do
that. But it is there to hire and fire the CEO. Some of you know (Ira
Millstein) from (Weil Gotschall), one of our gurus in the field. His view is,
he has one way of evaluating whether a board is effective or not.
It gets down to one simple rule in his view. Is it capable of hiring
and firing, or is it capable of firing the CEO? If it is, then it's a good board.
It can do the fundamental job it has. The fact is, that if the CEO and the
chairman are one in the same, that process becomes very difficult.
Obviously, it can happen. We have lots of companies in America where
CEOs have been fired from boards. But that tends to be, most of the time, a
case where it's too little too late, and too infrequent.
I think what we hope to see evolve in America is a situation where
boards really can operate in a way in which they can evaluate the
effectiveness of management in an ongoing manner, in an independent way
that reflects the interest of the shareholders, and not the interests of
management
By the way, this is not some radical idea. If you look all over the
world, there are really only two countries where you sort of have this
tradition of the so-called "imperial CEO." One is the United States and the
other is France. The French are actually tackling it to some extent. We'll see
what happens with past legislation, which is designed to move the country
away from that kind of practice.
We have in America a challenge before us in changing it because we
do not have a culture of splitting those two jobs. Even though if you look at
it, we're a strong leader in checks and balances in almost every other walk of
life. If you look at it, there is only one job in America where the person is
not really account to anyone; and that's the CEO. Even the President is
accountable to Congress and the Supreme Court. But we, in our CEOs, give
them an enormous power.
Again, we don't want to have a situation where we're stifling
creativity. That's not the point at all. What we want is a situation, which
allows creativity, but in a way that benefits the shareholders, and not
necessarily the management. Where the two converge, that's perfect. We
want them to be perfect. But, we need boards to make them converge. The
way we do that, I think, is to address the question.
We are, to be frank, nowhere near addressing that question. The
New York Stock Exchange guidelines released this summer, which are still
not approved yet by the SEC, goes as far as to say companies ought to
release the names of the individual who chairs the meetings of the
independent directors when they're meeting away from management. So,
that's sort of as close as they come to even the concept of having a lead
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director, who's a leader and a director. We don't have anybody higher
reaching, really, arguing for a split chairman and CEO.
To some extent, (Paul Volcker) is a very vocal supporter of this
concept. We have some funds that are working along these lines,
(Providence Capital), for instance, is one that has tried to rally shareholder
interest behind them. We have a long way to go on this, but I hope that we
do move in this direction. I suspect that we will.
We also need some other changes that will improve the board. We
need training for directors. You know, there are surprisingly few Director
Training Programs in America. We need more of those. We've had too
many cases where directors think -- and companies think, too -- that they
don't need anything extra. They can come in with all the skills that are
needed. We need to go back to audit committees. We need skilled people
there who know financial statements.
But we also need a culture of corporate governance in the
boardroom, which can come through training programs. We need
governance benchmarks at companies. Companies don't do enough to look
around the marketplace -- not just at home, but everywhere -- to fmd the best
practices that they can import that improve the effectiveness of the company
as a business. By that, I mean we have a lot of companies that think of used
RND to look for the best manufacturing process, or to look to countries with
good management ideas.
We need them to look now, for the best governance practices that
exist anywhere in the world. Our best corporations are progressive ones that
think long term, should be importing those kinds of ideas into their own
boardrooms so that we have a race to the top in companies. That, in turn,
will help their bottom line, because one of the great things that boards are
beginning to realize as more research is coming out on this; is that boards
that do better in corporate governance have access to capital at a cheaper rate
than their rivals would.
The fact is, that shareholders will pay more for companies that are
better governed. So, there's a business argument for good corporate
governance, and it's a strong argument for good corporate governance. It's
one that study after study now has confirmed. I would expect to see that the
boardrooms will take that now as a business reason to improve. It isn't just
something that affects reputation. It's not something where you want to
become the best and be in the headlines somewhere. It is to be competitive.
That's what it's about.
There are also other things that boards can do. One of the things
boards don't do very well, for the most part, is to review their own
operations, their own effectiveness. Many boards do evaluate the
effectiveness of the CEO periodically. We hope they do that. But very, very
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few take on this very sensitive and thorny issue. I acknowledge how difficult
that is to sit around the table and say: How are we doing as the
representative of the shareowner in this company? What are we doing
wrong? What are we doing right? How do we improve? Those are the
things that we need to see in boards.
One of the great things that I say about the Enron situation is that it
has broken this logic. We do have lots of fresh ideas coming out - not just
here, but everywhere -- about what might work. You know, I think it's at a
time when we should entertain some of those thoughts, mull them over, not
automatically reject them and see what might make sense.
There was an idea I had heard just two days ago, one that (Young)
used. It had the institute of directors make a case for having a shareholder
committee at companies making up those institutions that own, say 1 percent
or more of the company, having the shareholder committee nominate or
name you know X number over directors to every corporate board. So that
that these directors would be accountable directly to shareholders, rather than
nominated by the board of directors themselves. It's an interesting idea
worth thinking about. I think we need to really not project anything, but look
at ways in which we can energize our boards, and our owners, and our
legislation to this end of creating better boards and better accountability.
I would just end with this point. And, that is that there is this great
convergence financially around the world. If we look at the United States
and think about the changes we have undertaken recently, and then we look
at other codes that are now arising around the world -- merchant markets and
developed markets - it's about something like 75 codes in about 45
jurisdictions around the world, in that neighborhood.
If you look at the code that came out of Malaysia, or the code of
corporate governance that came out of India. You know those things could
have been written in New York or in Richmond. They're extraordinarily
similar. That's the remarkable thing about these; is that there is recognition
that even though there are different cultures in corporate governance around
the world, ultimately it's not an Anglo Saxon thing. Corporate governance is
not just something that is pushed by faceless fund managers in New York or
London.
Corporate governance is really something that gets to accountability
and trust. It goes right across cultures, and the way it's implemented might
be somewhat different from market to market. Ultimately, it isn't that
different. The kinds of companies that we want to see emerge isn't going to
be very different, one to another.
We're seeing a lot of legislation, a lot of principles, a lot of
self-regulation now emerging in different markets to bring that convergence
even closer. The Winter Committee, for example, in the European Union is
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going to talk about how to harmonize company law in Britain, in ways that
can ultimately bring us a little bit closer to where we are, or where the U.K.
is. There's a lot of work being done here now, which brings us closer in
some respect to where they are in Europe, and international accounting
standards is one example.
So, we have a converging international culture of corporate
governments. We're sort of at a point where we need to figure out exactly
how far to push it, or how quickly to push it.
It reminds me of a story. I don't know how many of you are familiar
with the stories of the (Wise Men of Helm), the story by (Shalm Lehem).
One of stories that he talks about is how there was one road going into the
little village of (Helm). A huge pothole opened up in front of the village on
this road. Day after day, horses and carriages were falling into it. People
would get injured, and it was just a big problem. The wise men of (Helm)
got together to ponder what they needed to do about this big pothole. The
solution that they came up with was that they would build a hospital next to
the pothole.
We're sort of at that same point. Do we need to build hospitals next
to our corporate governance potholes? Or do we really need to embrace the
tough issues that lie ahead of us and make the changes in law, ownership,
and boardroom practice that will get us forward, or that is best for our
economy?
Thank you, very much.
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